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November 5, 1974

Mr. William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Bill:

The enclosed two manuscripts are submitted for your approval. They have been sized for publication, and the conversational tone, which we feel is important, has been preserved.


Please make any necessary changes on these originals and return them in the enclosed envelope by noon Friday, November 8. Angus Thuermer can contact Howard Handleman, who will pick them up.

After return of the manuscript, your words will not be changed. We may have to eliminate an entire question and answer for space reasons. If news developments suggest substantive updating of your remarks or additional questions to be answered, we will get in touch with you.

Please keep in confidence our plan to publish this interview. Should you find it necessary, before this one appears, to grant other interviews on these same subjects either to television or other publication of national scope, please advise us by telephone since it may affect publication plans. As you may know, we generally release the text of our interviews to all media to coincide with our own publication.

Let me take this opportunity to express my personal appreciation for your time and co-operation in making these views available to our audience of more than nine million readers. Immediately upon publication, magazines will be mailed to your office.

Sincerely yours,


Marvin L. Stone
Executive Editor

MLS:n
Enclosures

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The massive flow of information pouring in to Washington requires William Colby, as Director of ^{Central} Intelligence, to make constant evaluations of fresh global developments bearing on U.S. interests.

The following, in his own words, is the appraisal Mr. Colby gave the editors of "U.S. News & World Report" of tensions around the world, what they mean, what they could lead to and the possible impact on the superpowers.

(space)

Strategic balance: U.S. vs. Russia. "The Soviets are ^{developing} embarking on deployment of new missile systems that obviously will increase their strategic power considerably.

"But we do not see that in the foreseeable future they ^{can} will have ^{te} dominance over us. We have both reached the point where we can destroy each other and the rest of the world, and they know it.

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"You ask if the transfer of American technology to the

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Soviets is a matter of concern.

"We know that ^{the} military ^{have} ~~purposes are~~ a very high priority

in Soviet decision-making. We ~~do~~ have procedures that put

limitations ^{giving them} on things of direct military value. And they

have a problem of adapting ^{our} technology which ~~in our way of~~
~~doing things~~ works because of ^{our} the competitive system. That

is a problem they've got to do some adjusting to.

"The Soviets are, of course, ^{well} ~~far~~ behind us technologically.

But they are able to challenge us in arms competition by taking
 a much more disciplined approach, ^{particularly in assigning their}
~~and putting in their major~~
^{to arms work.}
 best talent ~~particularly talent~~. One very interesting thing

is to compare the Soviet military work in space with the
 Soviet civilian work in space. There is an obvious quali-
 tative difference between the two. The military work is
 much, much better."

(space)

Detente: Why Soviets want it. "There are three main

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reasons for Soviet interest in promoting detente with the United States.

"First, they obviously want to prevent the kind of horrendous

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reasons for Soviet interest in promoting detente with the United States.

"First, they obviously want to prevent the kind of horrendous confrontation that is possible in this age of super-weapons. The ^{result} ~~idea~~ of a ^{nuclear} ~~military~~ exchange between us is just so incredible now that even ~~they~~ realize that something has to be done to avoid it.

"Secondly, they ~~do~~ insist that they be recognized as one of the world's two superpowers and get the status that implies. They might also benefit from their strength ~~entitled them to~~ relaxing the Western solidarity that characterized the 1950's and 1960's.

"Thirdly, they would like to accelerate their development in economic and technical terms, because as they look at ~~this~~ enormous power of the West -- America particularly, but also the other countries -- they see it moving at a tremendous rate, and they hope to benefit by a greater degree of exchange and ^{borrowing from} participation in that movement.

~~"The Soviet agreement to liberalize emigration policies~~

*correction in Red planned
to meet Graves
15 Nov 70*

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~~is something that gets very close to the bone on Soviet~~
~~decisions. But it obviously was a matter of great importance~~
~~to American policy and had to be handled in some fashion.~~

"Generally, the Soviet concern over ^{their} internal discipline
is very high. This is partly a result of detente. They
are ~~a little~~ nervous about what detente can do in terms
of getting new thoughts and new political drives going
within the Soviet Union. And they just don't want that to
happen."

Soviet empire: Starting to crumble? "The Soviets face
a ~~real~~ problem as their ~~satellite~~ states in Eastern Europe
show signs of ~~strong~~ dissatisfaction over iron-fisted con-
trol from Moscow. The Russians have made it clear that they
are not going to brook any substantial break in the ^{if} Eastern
European buffer zone.

"But, at the same time, they obviously have the problem
of dealing with the new political ideas that are circulating

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in some of those countries -- including demands for greater freedom of action.

"The old idea of total Soviet dominance and control is under challenge even from some of the Communist Party leaders in Eastern Europe."

(space)

Western Europe: Communist penetration. "One thing the Soviets want ~~to see~~ is Communist participation in the governments of Western Europe.

"This is in line with Communist ideology which says that collapse of the European ^{democratic} ~~free enterprise~~ system is inevitable, ^{so} ~~and~~ that the movement of Communist forces from minority voices to participation will enable the Communists to take ^{eventually} ^{there} over governments and run them.

"Obviously, the Communists are playing a role in ^{some} ~~Portu~~ ~~countries~~ ~~gal's Government now. They have considerable influence in~~ ~~other countries~~ by reason of the 25 per cent or 28 per cent

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of the votes they represent and the difficulties of organizing

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governments among the fragmented parties, ~~on the other side.~~

^{non-Communist}
^{been some}
"I think there's an increase in Communist Party influence."

But ^{several trends} ~~a couple of curves~~ are running: One is the increase in European Party in these countries; Communist influence ^{and the} other is the ^{apparent} increased independence of European Communist parties from Moscow's control.

is the non-Communist parties' reaction to this, to determine to each other
It's really a little premature to tell where these curves

trend lines are going to cross.

"We are certainly not saying, 'It doesn't matter whether the Communists participate in power.' What I'm saying is that this is a very complicated, multifactored matter ~~to look at.~~

~~"We've seen evidence of various agents the Communists have had in NATO-related situations. If you get a Communist Party participating ^{es} in a government which is a member of NATO, you then begin to put political factors into the handling of intelligence matters -- and suddenly some of these secret matters become subjects of political controversy in~~

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~~various NATO countries. This can get very complicated.~~

(space)

Sino-Soviet hostility: War isn't imminent. "The Soviets

take a very serious view of China as a danger to them in the long run. Russian concern centers on Chinese missile systems -- strategic systems. They have worked hard on their intelligence about those matters.

"But I don't see a war starting in the near future, even though there is considerable hostility on both sides of the Soviet and Chinese positions -- and there is a gulf between them. This hostility certainly will go on as long as the present leadership lasts on both sides -- and probably will not be all that different in the succeeding leaderships.

"I don't anticipate a great deal of change in Chinese policy or Chinese-Soviet policies after Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai pass from the scene. This goes beyond personalities. I think the Chinese feel that they have to defend

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themselves against Soviet influence and that this will continue more or less in those terms.

"The Soviets certainly want to avoid any Chinese-American collaboration against them. As they see it, the one element of that equation that they can make some kind of arrangement with is America. They really haven't been able to do much with the Chinese."

(space)

Cuba: Castro's policy now. "Fidel Castro's attempts to export his brand of Communist ^{insurgency} ~~revolution~~ to other countries of Latin America ^{didn't work.} ~~have diminished greatly.~~ The Cubans have stressed in recent years the development of state-to-state relationships and ~~have tried to get out of the business of~~ ~~being accused of trying to overthrow everybody.~~ And they've been quite successful with that new policy.

"As for Russia, the Soviets still rate Cuba as a geographic asset, no question about it. It's a very substantial

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geographic asset, but it's a very costly one to them in terms of the support the Cubans have required over the years.

"Cuba's present activities in Latin America -- stressing state links ~~rather than insurgency links~~ -- are, in general, of long-term use to Soviet interests. ~~But Cuba is not a spearhead of Communist revolution in Latin America.~~"

(space)

War in Mideast: Quite possible. "Another round of war between Israel and the Arabs is possible -- quite possible.

in great part on
"It depends ~~on whether the U.S. can reconstruct~~ peace-making diplomacy ~~and get that going~~. Obviously, the ^{Arab} ~~Rabat~~ summit meeting at which ^{Rabat} ~~Arab leaders~~ named the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians living on Arab land held by Israel ^{raises new} ~~puts a~~ *difficulties.* ~~new factor in it.~~

"As for the Soviet role: They ~~do have a~~ desire to play the role of a major power, ~~particularly~~ in the Middle East-

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ern area. They are endeavoring to express that through their naval presence, through their ^{military} aid programs, through their ^{economic} ~~military~~ aid and so forth. ~~The nature of~~ their policy right now is to keep that presence active, keep ^{the} that capability of influencing the situation. But at the same time they have a considerable interest in continuing ~~the~~ detente ~~program~~ with the United States.

~~"The Soviets have indicated that they would go along with a Mideast peace settlement in which they played a substantial role. A settlement would deprive the Soviets of a situation they have been able to exploit -- the Arab-Israeli conflict. But also, at the same time, it would remove a danger that the thing might go off the tracks.~~

They've got to try to go along a rather narrow track without abandoning their influence, but, on the other hand, not seeing the whole thing derail.

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"The Soviets do get a certain amount of benefit from the

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economic troubles that afflict the West as a result of the oil problems, but they don't have to do much about that. It's taking place pretty much on its own.

"On the other hand, they have to realize that an aggressive move ^{by them} to cut off oil ^{cause} would ~~have to create~~ a reaction on our side. ~~Certainly~~ ^I it would be a very direct affront to any detente hopes that they have.

(END)

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